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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RANDY J. MONTOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960227-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Arguments not addressed in this reply brief were 
adequately analyzed in Appellant's opening brief or do not merit 
reply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT A VALID INVENTORY SEARCH 
OCCURRED. 
A. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH A LAWFUL 
IMPOUNDMENT. 
A lawful impoundment is required for a valid inventory 
search. See State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985). In 
this case, a lawful impoundment did not occur where the officers 
did not establish the nature of the standards guiding inventory 
searches, used the search as a pretext to search for drugs, and 
returned the vehicle to its owner after searching it. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 15-39. 
The State argues that it need not establish "reasonable 
and proper justification for impoundment" due to the post-Hygh 
decision in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). See 
State's brief at 9-10. In Bertine, the Court relied on its prior 
decision in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), pointing 
out that "[t]he reasonableness of any particular governmental 
activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence 
of alternative 'less intrusive' means." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 
374, quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647. Bertine does not rule 
out a consideration of the necessity of the impoundment. Id. 
Instead, pursuant to Bertine, the focus is on whether the State 
established the existence of reasonable, standardized procedures 
relating to the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles and that 
such procedures were administered in good faith. Bertine, 479 
U.S. at 374. Additionally, post-Bertine cases require that a 
vehicle be "properly impounded . . . in good faith following 
reasonable, standardized procedures." State v. Shamblin, 763 
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah App. 1988) (citation omitted). 
Montoya is arguing in this unusual case where the 
officers conducted an extensive "inventory" search of the vehicle 
but did not impound it, the State failed to establish that a 
lawful impoundment occurred or the necessity of inventorying the 
vehicle. Because a lawful impoundment did not occur in this 
case, the "inventory" search was not justified. 
In regard to the policy for returning a vehicle to a non-
arrestee owner, Officer McCarthy stated, "That's the decision I 
made as the senior man on the scene because I know the family." 
R. 111. This response coupled with his previous responses fails 
to establish the nature of the policy for impounding vehicles 
where the owner is not arrested. Instead, the testimony suggests 
that rather than following a standardized procedure in impounding 
2 
vehicles, the senior officer has unbridled discretion. Such 
unbridled discretion does not pass constitutional muster since it 
allows officers to decide whether to conduct inventory searches 
without being directed by standardized procedures. See Florida 
v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). 
In addition, the State's claim on page 13 of its brief 
that "officers initiated their impoundment procedure while 
simultaneously trying to locate the Mitsubishi's owner" is not 
supported by the evidence. Indeed, the State fails to support 
this statement with record cites. The evidence actually suggests 
that officers began "inventorying" the vehicle before attempting 
to locate the owner. R. 98, 100, 106, 107, 115-16, 125.x 
Montoya argued in the trial court, among other things, 
that the failure to impound the vehicle rendered the "inventory" 
search invalid and that the inventory search was a pretext to 
search for drugs. R. 28-31. He relied on a number of cases 
including Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, and State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 
979, 987 (Utah App. 1992). Under these circumstances, Montoya's 
arguments on appeal regarding the inventory search were preserved 
for review. 
1
 Montoya quotes a portion of McCarthy's testimony on page 29 
of his brief, inadvertently deleting a portion of the testimony 
which refers to the use of a canine and the prosecutor's follow-up 
question. The State includes the complete quote in footnote 2 on 
page 11 of its brief. The deleted portion indicates that the 
officer called for a canine officer, but that there was not one 
available, and that McCarthy does not ordinarily make an inventory 
list in the course of an inventory search. R. 110-11; see 
transcript in Addendum A to this brief. 
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B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE 
"INVENTORY" SEARCH WAS DONE IN CONFORMANCE WITH 
STANDARDIZED PROCEDURES. 
The State is correct that the officers testified that 
West Valley City has a standardized procedure for inventorying 
vehicles. See State's brief at 13. The officers did not, 
however, sufficiently outline the details of that standardized 
procedure so that the trial judge or this Court could make a 
determination as to whether the policy was followed in this case. 
Testimony that the policy was followed is not sufficient; 
instead, the State must establish the details of the policy so 
that the fact finder can determine whether the policy was 
followed in a given case. See Stricklinq, 844 P.2d at 988-90 
(noting that although evidence of departmental procedures was 
thin, it was sufficient to establish that such procedures existed 
and that officers acted in conformity with the procedures). 
Additionally, the officers supplied conflicting testimony as to 
whether they were required pursuant to the standardized 
procedures to fill out an inventory form as part of an inventory 
search. See R. 104 (inventory form is required); 105-06 
(inventory form is not necessarily standard procedure); 111 
(officer does not ordinarily make an inventory list but there is 
an inventory sheet which he frequently uses). 
Although the State has the burden of establishing that a 
valid inventory search was conducted, it attempts to shift that 
burden to Montoya by arguing that since Montoya never asked 
whether the inventory search policy included a search of the 
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trunk, Montoya waived the argument. State's brief at 15. This 
claim by the State reflects a fundamental misunderstanding as to 
the State's burden in attempting to establish that police 
activity fits within an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement. See Strickling, 844 P. 2d at 985. As this Court 
pointed out: 
Numerous decisions require that the 
government demonstrate the existence of 
standardized procedures to regulate particular 
aspects of police conduct during inventory 
searches in order for such searches to satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Florida v. Wells, 
495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 
1 (1990) (where no policy existed regarding 
treatment of closed containers during inventory 
search police could not open locked suitcase); 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1987) 
(police were justified in looking under hood when 
such a search was conducted according to police 
department procedures for all vehicles); 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28 ("Fourth Amendment 
is violated if closed containers are opened 
during a vehicle inventory search in the absence 
of a standardized, specific procedure mandating 
their opening") (emphasis in original). 
Strickling, 844 P.2d at 988. 
The State failed to establish in this case that the 
standardized procedures for inventory searches by West Valley 
Police included the trunk and/or under the spare tire. 
Regardless of whether a trunk is an obvious area of concern when 
conducting an inventory search, the State had the burden of 
establishing that the standardized procedure encompassed a search 
of the trunk. The State's failure to establish that the search 
of the trunk and under the spare tire was done in conformance 
with standardized procedure is not attributable to Montoya; 
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instead, it demonstrates that the State failed to sustain its 
burden in this case of establishing that the search was made in 
conformance with standardized procedures. The search therefore 
fails to qualify under the inventory search exception. 
C. LACK OF PRETEXT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR A VALID 
INVENTORY SEARCH. 
The totality of the circumstances in this case 
demonstrate that the "inventory" search of the vehicle was a 
pretext or subterfuge to search for narcotics evidence. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 33-38. Relying on State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1995); and Whren v. United States, U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 
135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the State claims pretext analysis should 
be rejected in the inventory search context. State's brief at 
15-17. 
The analyses in Lopez, Harmon and Whren are 
distinguishable from an inventory search analysis since those 
cases considered police investigations of criminal conduct where 
officers had probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to justify 
their activity. By contrast, a valid inventory search occurs in 
the absence of probable cause and suspends the probable cause/ 
warrant requirement. 
In an inventory context, the State need not establish 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion in order to justify the 
exception. Instead, it must establish that a valid inventory 
search occurred, thereby suspending the particularized suspicion 
requirement. Inventorying a vehicle must not be a ruse or 
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subterfuge in order to allow the suspension of the probable cause 
requirement. See Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97. By contrast, in 
Whren, Lopez and Harmon, the officers had probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to justify the detention when the 
circumstances were viewed objectively. Pretext analysis was 
therefore unnecessary since the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause/reasonable suspicion requirement was met. 
In order to be a valid inventory search which allows 
suspension of the probable cause/warrant requirement, the 
inventory search must not be a pretext. The lack of subterfuge 
or pretext is a prerequisite for allowing an inventory search to 
be upheld even though officers had neither a warrant nor 
particularized suspicion. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 370 (1976); Wells, 495 U.S. at 3; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268; 
Whren, 135 L.Ed.2d at 97. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S ALTERNATIVE SEARCH 
ARGUMENTS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, 
DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE. 
The State makes a two-step fall back argument for the 
first time on appeal. See State's brief at 17-23. The State 
claims that (1) the search of the passenger compartment was done 
incident to arrest, and (2) the officers had probable cause and 
exigent circumstances which justified the search of the entire 
vehicle. This two-step argument does not support affirmance in 
this case since the State did not raise the arguments in the 
trial court, it did not introduce evidence sustaining its burden 
of establishing the arguments and the trial judge did not make 
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factual findings regarding disputed facts relating to the newly 
raised arguments. 
While this Court may affirm a trial court's ruling on an 
alternative ground which was not relied on by the trial court, 
such affirmance on an alternative ground is not appropriate where 
the State did not introduce evidence to sustain its burden of 
establishing that ground or factual issues relating to that 
ground have not been resolved by the trial court. See State v. 
Wells, 3 04 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8-9 (Utah App. 1996) (refusing to 
affirm on alternative ground of search incident to arrest where 
State "failed to meet its burden of proof to justify [the] search 
as a search incident to arrest"); Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Assn., 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969) (record must 
support alternative basis in order to affirm on that ground); 
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) (refusing to 
consider State's alternative basis for affirmance which was 
raised for first time on certiorari due to "lack of factual 
findings combined with failure to raise [the] issue below"); 
State v. Franks, 889 P.2d 209, 212 (N.M. 1994) ("unfair to an 
appellant to affirm on a fact dependent ground not raised 
below"). Additionally, this Court should refuse to review these 
claims since the State did not raise them in the trial court. 
See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996) . 
A. THE STATE WAIVED THESE ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS 
BY NOT RAISING THEM IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision in South left open 
the question of whether an appellate court may affirm on an 
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a l t e r n a t i v e g r o u n d w h i ^ h t h ^ a p n ^ l l e e n .-) *. - >-\~ \ ^  in t-h^ t-.rial 
r e q u i r e d r .• fij=r ^ -oss-appeal •: o r d e r to a r g u e t n a t t h e 
a:,r..e .-.•,!•- •.-:;• = ^ ' : - v
 r* ! r r -; :v ; ••- zr: :: v. • • v •• 
argue^ :.•• -.he •. . udge. .-.K: Supreme Cou/i expnoiL ...y stated; 
however, that ' wa-; P )t addressina !,:hr question of whether an 
appel lee nr - * . f -r. .. 
judgment when the atqument was -/;i presenteu in i:ne Lowei couir, 
and nrted that :T^ '^ vioii-' -opinions on th^r question have been 
omitted), indeed, W J le Utah appellate com ns have affirmed on 
such altem-ttip^" qroundr ' :'~ S^rremo rv>ur^ •.,-.- Vls^ refused i '* 
number of aec:,_ ..,. -^J!-.'-.J~ .. . 
a lower court ' i • lecision where that argument was ncr raise-5 : 
p":f-.-t ; ,,i a - • -,: t •".;!-• ' . . . . . . ; ; y : ^ y .;. __ia 
L&M Corp. v. Loader, ., ' . * • 11 - - .^- ^ ;b « ) , i^.^_e. also 
American Coal Co . v. Sandstrom, 689 P , 2d : • 1,;*•--4 . 
H-. . . . • - <- ~ --..-- • 
in ^he ti J a". c. ^  . . ordei c^ rdi^ L;>-.:. < ^ , J^I.; trr 
affirmance nn appeal ••. u. • ,; fairness arid *:d the search 
f 
burde* o *. e s t a i u s h i n g tnu-i i easuiiabj. t . i iess <,; i.nt; w a r r a n t l e s s 
s e a i c i ,!, r . * '"-3Sf' «iid net inak^ i r ^ inci r i ' -nr t - a r r e s t , 
P . , , :.. . ~ -.1 • . . . 
court, aiJ cf '..he e\ • aence regarding tii^ se claims may uo\ nave 
been presented. Additionally, the trial judge may have made 
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findings and conclusions against those claims. This Court should 
refuse to review the State's fact dependent arguments which were 
raised for the first time on appeal as an alternative basis for 
affirmance. See Franks, 889 P.2d at 212. 
B. THE LACK OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE 
PRECLUDE RELIANCE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE. 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court created an "incident to arrest" exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Pursuant to that 
exception, contemporaneous with arrests, "an officer may search 
the area within the arrestee's 'immediate control' to prevent the 
arrestee from obtaining weapons or destroying evidence." Wells, 
304 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 766). 
A warrantless search "incident to arrest" is justified if 
the State can show that certain temporal and geographical factors 
and exigent circumstances existed at the time of the arrest. 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764; see also Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 
818, 819-20 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970); 
Hvcrh, 711 P.2d at 272 n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (limiting 
warrantless search to "an area within which a suspect could 
reasonably be expected to grab a weapon or destroy evidence"); 
State v. Ricks, 816 P.2d 125, 128 (Alaska 1991) (a search remote 
in time or place from arrest cannot be justified). 
The Fourth Amendment incident to arrest exception has 
been extended to include a search of the passenger compartment of 
a vehicle. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). For the 
10 
s^^v n n ri - naqqpnn* r ^n^partment L?J be a vaxid incident *- • 
c.^ i St., ,.. ,~ . . be made contemporaneously w ith 
the arrest anc for * T - safety o* the officers. Belton, 453 U.S. 
at <±o i . 
— ^eiton, =» i^n^ officer searched four occupants and a 
vehicle i r. • : > ' ,_ :; arrest aftei stoppinq t::e vehicle fr,] lowing a 
! • • > ' -
\ehi.le. ±Az.. — - -r j '"^  Court uph^ri • P-V seai-jh Decause it 
was .^ ntemi)ora:ie-jus "„* the arrests and based on safety concerns. 
The Belton Court articulated a bright line test for 
searches '?•" veM'",1ri oassenger compartments which are made 
[W]hen a pol Lceman has made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, 
• • • as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that 
automchi " * 
Id. A* 4^--, emphasis added) . see also State v. Kent 6 6L' F 2d 
3 - - , iton 
undei simiiai i rcumstances wheie search ,. * passenger compartment 
is made as contempoi aneous incident t."> irrest .-. . * ^  -af>t~y 
r e a - • • • ••<; • • L ^  t o v_._ ._^i-^.- -_-_.  
cert . denied, 9'J^  P ;.d 90c* (Ur.ar j^.-m/ I.IJJ(- Couru neld chat i he 
search of a passeng? compa r r men L wh i ch ^a.: nade contemporaneous 
wit I I arrefc .-;••". . . .e 
ca r was a v a i i o s ea i ch i n c i d e n t r •:.• a r r e s t even though the 
a r r e s t e e w a s ] i a r l c j c uff e c j a n c j j _ r l t he p o l i c e c a r . The t e ^ r ^ r a l .. 
11 
proximity of the search to the arrest permitted this Court to 
affirm on that alternative ground.2 
1. No Factual Findings 
In order to properly apply the incident to arrest 
exception to justify a warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, the trial court must find that the 
search was a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, the vehicle 
was within the arrestee's "immediate control" and the search was 
conducted for the safety of the officers. While the Belton rule 
may not require "a detailed analysis" by the officer as to 
whether or not he/she may lawfully search a vehicle, it 
nevertheless requires safety concerns and temporal and 
geographical proximity. 
In this case, because the State did not argue to the 
trial court that the incident to arrest exception justified the 
search of the passenger compartment, the trial judge did not rule 
on that issue and made no findings relevant to that issue. 
Specifically, the record does not contain findings as to whether 
the search was made as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, that 
the vehicle was in Montoya's immediate control or whether safety 
concerns for the officers were involved. In this case where the 
evidence supports a finding that the search was not 
contemporaneous, the vehicle was not in the immediate control of 
2
 In Moreno, the State made its incident to arrest argument 
in the trial court before urging this Court to accept that argument 
as an alternative basis for affirmance. Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1249 
n.l. 
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the officers a^i th- -ffleers had n<"- conrprr^ for their saf-^tv, 
appea ] as an alternative grounds for affirmance. £.ee. discussion 
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arrest exception to justify a search, they are not being required 
to make analyses in the field regarding its application. In this 
case where neither officers nor the State relied on the 
exception, it should not be applied as a basis for affirmance. 
C. THE SEARCH OF THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT WAS 
NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION. 
The Belton search incident to arrest rule does not apply 
to the search of a passenger compartment of a vehicle under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Instead, the 
Utah Constitution requires that officers have probable cause and 
traditional exigent circumstances to justify the search of a 
vehicle. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).3 A 
majority of the Utah Supreme Court has analyzed Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution to provide greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances. See Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 461, 473 (plurality requires probable cause and 
traditional exigent circumstances under Utah Constitution, third 
justice concurs in result); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416 
(Utah 1991) . Pursuant to the Larocco plurality, warrantless 
searches "are permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect safety of police or the public 
or to prevent the destruction of the evidence." Larocco, 794 
P.2d at 469-70 (citations omitted). Other Utah decisions have 
held that the warrantless search of a vehicle can be justified 
3
 Montoya was not required to raise this state constitutional 
argument in the trial court since the State, which had the burden 
of establishing the reasonableness of the search, did not rely on 
the search incident to arrest exception below. 
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compartment.. Although they had arrested Montoya for public . ,-
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intoxication, they had no information which would establish 
probable cause to believe that Montoya had contraband in his car. 
Additionally, exigent circumstances did not exist since the 
officers had arrested and handcuffed Montoya and had custody and 
control over the vehicle; see discussion infra at 16-19. 
Accordingly, the search of the passenger compartment violated the 
Utah Constitution. 
D. PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DID 
NOT EXIST WHICH JUSTIFIED THE SEARCH OF THE 
TRUNK. 
As the second step of its two-part alternative grounds 
for affirmance argument, the State claims that after officers 
searched the passenger compartment and found the syringe and 
spoon, they had probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
justify the search of the trunk. State's brief at 19-24. 
Assuming this Court agrees with Montoya's argument that 
the passenger compartment was not properly searched incident to 
arrest, this argument fails. Alternatively, it fails because 
officers had neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances to 
justify the search of the trunk and the argument was waived by 
not raising it below. By failing to raise this argument in the 
trial court, the State waived this argument for appeal. See 
discussion supra at 7-10. 
Additionally, the record does not establish that the 
officers had probable cause to search the trunk. The officers' 
determination that Montoya appeared to be under the influence of 
drugs did not give rise to any information about the location of 
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tria;. Montoya neurit ;.i\^ . ! he JUur s spec ilation on 
appeal that the search of the trunk "might reveal evidence of a 
medical ailment or treatment that contributed to Montoya's 
condition" (State's brief at 22) fails to create an exigency. 
Nor was there any indication that anyone else might ingest a 
substance in the vehicle. 
In Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), 
afjLLd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), this Court adopted a three-prong 
test for determining whether the community caretaker exception 
applies to the Fourth Amendment: 
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth 
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based 
upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in 
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker 
function--under the given circumstances, would a 
reasonable officer had stopped a vehicle for a 
purpose consistent with community caretaker 
functions? Third, based upon an objective 
analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an 
imminent danger to life or limb? 
Warden, 844 P.2d at 364. 
The State's community caretaker claim in this case fails 
on all three prongs. First, this case involved a search not a 
seizure. Second, a reasonable officer would not have searched 
the vehicle in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker 
function. The only person arguably being "protected" by the 
search was Montoya; officers already had information needed, and 
medical personnel who presumably could obtain further information 
if necessary for Montoya's "treatment" were enroute and arrived 
shortly after McCarthy. R. 118-20. Montoya's "medical needs 
were being taken care of by someone other than" the officers; 
such care was sufficient. R. 118-19. Speculation that officers 
might find drugs in the trunk does not satisfy the objective 
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bona fide caretaker function prong. Even if drugs were found, 
officers would have no way of knowing whether that was the 
substance ingested by Montoya or whether additional substances 
were also involved. The search of the trunk was a search for 
evidence; from an objective perspective, it was not made in 
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function. 
Third, the circumstances did not demonstrate imminent 
danger to life or limb. While Montoya appeared to be under the 
influence of drugs, medical personnel were on the way. R. 118. 
Firemen, not EMT's, arrived and were sufficient, and the officers 
cancelled the ambulance. R. 119. Montoya was conscious, 
standing and communicating. He apparently was not vomiting, 
since officers placed him in the police car. Unfortunately, many 
persons ingest illegal substances or large quantities of alcohol. 
While medical care may be appropriate in some cases, suspending 
Fourth Amendment protections is not unless a true exigency which 
may save a life exists.4 
These circumstances do not fit in the community caretaker 
exception. Nor does an exigency exist based on the inherent 
mobility. Additionally, the officers did not have probable cause 
to search the vehicle. Accordingly, the State's alternative 
argument for affirmance fails. 
4
 Even if the evidence arguably supported the State's claim 
of imminent danger to life or limb and that a reasonable officer 
would have searched the vehicle for a community caretaker purpose, 
this argument, raised for the first time on appeal, fails due to 
waiver and the lack of findings. See discussion supra at 7-10. 
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POINT III. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION OF NEW 
YORK V. OUARLES DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE 
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCE ON THE MIRANDA ISSUE. 
The State agrees that the trial judge's ruling that 
11
 [t] here were no incriminating statements made after [Montoya7 s] 
arrest" is not supported by the record. State's brief at 25. 
That determination is therefore clearly erroneous. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 40-41. 
The State also agrees that the court tacitly found that 
Montoya was not Mirandized; unless this Court applies the public 
safety Miranda exception articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649 (1984), to this case, Montoya's statement should have 
been suppressed. See State's brief at 25. The only issue for 
this Court then is whether the public safety exception of 
Quarles, raised by the State for the first time on appeal, should 
be extended to justify suspending the protections of Miranda 
where an arrestee is intoxicated. 
In Quarles, officers chased an armed suspected rapist 
through a crowded store. Id. at 649. When officers apprehended 
the suspect, he had an empty holster and no gun. Id. Without 
advising the suspect of his Miranda rights, officers asked him 
where the gun was. Id. Because officers were justified in 
believing that the gun was in the store which put the public at 
risk, the Court allowed admission of the suspect's response. The 
Court indicated that it was creating "a narrow exception to the 
Miranda rule" because the officer asked "only the question 
necessary to locate the missing gun" and "the need for answers to 
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questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety 
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 655-6. 
The State cites only three cases in support of its claim 
that Ouarles should be extended to this distinct situation; none 
of those cases actually extend Ouarles to a situation where the 
claimed public safety is protection of an arrestee who has 
ingested drugs. See State's brief at 24-28, citing Ouarles, 467 
U.S. 649; United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 960-61 (10th 
Cir. 1987); and Franks, 889 P.2d at 209. Padilla5 and Ouarles 
apply the exception in its original public safety context; Franks 
does not apply the exception at all. 
In Franks, the issue before the Court was whether the 
defendant's statement was voluntary. Id. at 213-14. Franks did 
not involve a situation where the defendant was in custody and 
Miranda warnings were required; indeed, the court explicitly 
began its analysis, "by emphasizing that this is not a case that 
comes under Miranda" because "[d]efendant does not contend that 
he was under arrest or otherwise in custody during his 
interchange with officers . . . ." Id. The Court concluded that 
the statement was voluntary, relying on Ouarles in a string cite 
for the proposition that the subjective intent of the officers is 
not relevant. Id. at 214. The language quoted in the State's 
5
 In Padilla, "[a]fter apprehending Mr. Padilla, who had been 
waving a gun, and observing bullet holes in the window of the 
residence, [the detective] was faced with the immediate necessity 
of determining whether someone inside was injured or armed or 
both." Padilla, 819 F.2d at 961. 
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brief at 2 8 was made in reference to the voluntariness issue and 
not the question of whether intoxication on the part of the 
arrestee creates a public safety exception to Miranda. The 
State's suggestion in its brief at 28 that the Franks Court 
followed Ouarles and applied a public safety exception to Miranda 
based on drug intoxication is incorrect. 
Additionally, the language from Franks quoted by the 
State emphasizes the impropriety of affirming on the basis of a 
public safety exception to Miranda in this case. Although the 
Franks Court discussed voluntariness and did not address whether 
a public safety exception to Miranda applies to narcotics 
arrestees, even if the passage were applied to this context, the 
language of the passage itself indicates that affirmance on this 
ground would not be proper. The State quoted the following 
passage from Franks: 
When officers respond to a medical emergency and 
find the victim in such a state that he or she 
may be unable to communicate later with medical 
personnel, the officers have a duty to obtain as 
much information as they can concerning the 
medically relevant cause of the victim's 
condition. 
State's brief at 28, quoting Franks, 889 P.2d at 214. Montoya 
was not a victim in this case; he was an arrestee. Montoya was 
not in such a state that he would later be unable to communicate, 
had already supplied information to officers, and continued to 
talk with officers and was well enough that the ambulance was 
cancelled. R. 118. At the very least, this presents a factual 
issue, unresolved by the trial court, as to whether Montoya was 
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"in such a state that he . . . may be unable to communicate later 
with medical personnel." Id. at 214; see discussion regarding 
waiver where issue not raised below and disputed facts exist 
supra at 7-10. Franks provides no support for extending the 
public safety exception of Ouarles to the facts or this case or 
for relying on such a novel and unpreserved extension as an 
alternative basis for affirmance. 
The Ouarles public safety exception to Miranda applies in 
limited circumstances "to protect the general public from the 
defendant" and not on "the plight of the particular victim of the 
defendant's actions" or the defendant himself. See State v. 
Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. 1992).6 This Court should 
reject the State's attempt to broaden the narrow Ouarles 
exception to the facts of this case where the State has failed to 
supply this Court with adequate analysis or support for such an 
extension. 
Additionally, the facts in this case do not justify 
6
 Instead of relying on the public safety exception where 
officers asked the defendant the location of his injured wife 
without Mirandizing him, the Provost Court focused on the 
California "rescue doctrine." The State has not briefed the rescue 
doctrine in this case nor asked the court to rely on it, so this 
Court should not consider that analysis. Additionally, the 
exigencies required by the rescue doctrine were not met in this 
case since (1) no urgency existed since medical personnel were on 
their way and Montoya was able to converse and walk around; in 
fact, officers waited for McCarthy to arrive and did not rush 
Montoya to a hospital even after obtaining the information; (2) 
Montoya was not near death as evidenced by officers proceeding with 
the search of the car rather than taking him to a hospital; and 
(3) the officers' primary purpose was to find evidence rather than 
help Montoya. Furthermore, the lack of findings precludes review. 
See discussion supra at 7-10. 
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applying a public safety rationale. Although Montoya was 
intoxicated and later treated, his life was not in danger as 
evidenced by his ability to walk and talk, the delay in 
questioning him about heroin until McCarthy arrived, and the lack 
of action taken by officers to immediately treat or transport 
Montoya to a hospital once they received answers. Medical 
personnel had been called, the ambulance was cancelled and 
Montoya was capable of conversing with such personnel; 
questioning by officers was unnecessary and not justified by a 
threat to the general public safety or Montoya's safety. See 
discussion supra at 17-19. 
If this Court were to apply the Ouarles public safety 
exception to these circumstances, it would in essence be 
suspending Miranda for intoxicated arrestees.7 In addition, 
even if this Court were to extend the Ouarles exception to 
protect the safety of the arrestee, the facts do not establish 
that Montoya's life was in danger or that the primary purpose of 
the questioning was to protect him. Additionally, this Court 
could not apply the broadened exception without factual findings 
7
 The State's gratuitous footnote 7 on page 28 of its brief, 
claiming that Montoya would not have understood the Miranda 
warnings, has no bearing on the legal analysis in this case. 
Indeed, the State does not cite to any cases and makes no attempt 
to supply this Court with legal analysis regarding the importance 
of its speculation. Nor does the State provide any factual support 
for its speculative comment; the State has not established that 
Montoya would not have understood Miranda and the court did not 
make findings on that issue. Additionally, arrestees often do not 
understand the intricacies of Miranda; such lack of understanding 
does not dispense with the Miranda requirement. In fact, in such 
circumstances, articulation of Miranda rights takes on greater, not 
lesser, importance. 
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and further evidence. It would be unfair to affirm on this 
ground, raised for the first time on appeal, where (1) the facts 
do not support the exception; (2) Montoya was not given the 
opportunity to introduce evidence since the State did not rely on 
this ground below; (3) the trial judge did not make factual 
findings; and (4) the extension of the exception to include 
protection of the defendant is unwarranted and unsupported by 
adequate analysis. Because the Ouarles public safety exception 
does not provide an alternative basis for affirmance, the trial 
judge's ruling that Miranda was not violated must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Montoya respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this l*44dL day of January, 1997. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
were looking for registration and then they finally come up 
with some paper work. I think it might have even been an 
ID card as well as the bill of sale for the owners, and I 
recognized those people so — 
Q Were they people that you knew or were acquainted 
with? 
A I knew them, yes, and I had asked Larry if I could 
take — I mean, Paul if I could take care of the car to 
save Randy and the family the expense of having it impounded. 
Q So it was your decision to have it returned to the 
family members? 
A I think I was the acting supervisor that night and 
that's, you know, that's my call. 
Q Are you familiar with the West Valley Police 
Department's policies regarding inventory searches? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And what is the basis of that, to your knowledge? 
A I helped write the zero tolerance policy on 
impounding vehicles. 
Q And what is that policy with respect to making 
inventory searches of vehicles? In what circumstances is 
that done? 
A Any time we arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's 
going to be impounded, an inventory will be done, and if 
possible, a canine officer will have the doa do a sniff of 
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the vehicle for the purposes of looking for narcotics. 
Q And was that policy followed in this instance? 
A I think we had called for a canine, but they got 
off at two that morning, so there wasn't one available, 
Q Now, do you ordinarily make an inventory list in 
the course of this inventory search? 
A No, if there's something out of place, you would 
note it. If there was something of value or something like 
that, you could take it into custody or you could give it 
to the owner. We do have an inventory sheet. I very 
frequently use it. I just note it in the narrative of the 
report. 
Q Is there a policy for consideration of circumstances! 
such as in this case where it is determined the driver of the] 
car is not the owner of the car? 
A That's the decision I made as the senior man on 
the scene because I know the family. 
MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT: All right. You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BROWN: 
Q Officer McCarthy, you're familiar with me; we've 
had conversations in the past. 
A I think we have, Dave. 
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